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INFORMATION, MEASUREMENT, AND PREDICTION IN ECONOMICS
Abstract
This paper examines the flow of production and use of economic infor-
mation and analyzes the effects of measurement errors, particularly as
transmitted through expectations and forecasts. Economic data are subject
to a variety of errors, and the uncertainty about economic measures tends
to increase further with the amount and complexity of the processing per-
formed on the underlying data as well as with the distance between the user
and the processor. With some exceptions, economic time series lag signifi-
cantly behind their reference periods and many undergo large revisions.
The effective information lag includes not only the time required for
incremental data to be produced and transmitted but also the time re-
quired for the signals to be extracted by the user. This lag is sub-
stantial for many important series.
In general, there is no presumption that the measurement errors are
random: Systematic errors are frequent and their sources and forms vary
so much that they may be difficult to detect. In times of strong shocks
and surprising developments (such as occurred earlier in this decade),
measurement of short-term changes in the economy is particularly diffi-
cult and current signals are apt to be often misinterpreted. This can
result in broadly diffused decision errors which in time are discovered,
leading to sharp corrective reactions.
Aggregative predictions from well known and influential sources
show certain coimnon patterns of error, which suggests that forecasters
react similarly to the observed events and unanticipated shocks. Fore-
casts of GNP and related variables are adversely affected by errors in both
the preliminary data and the base level estimates. There is some support
here for the hypothesis that information lags play a significant role in
generating business cycles, but it is important to note that the errors
involved in predicting the future are typically much larger than the errors
involved in estimating the present or recent past.
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I. On the Nature and Uses of Economic Information
Growth in the modern economy is motivated by the desire to accu-
mulate human and physical resources (capital in the most general sense)
and accomplished by actions that necessarily have long—term consequences.
The decisions to choose these particular courses of action (strat-
egies) involve similarly long expectations and often large risks of
highly variable payoffs. Moreover, knowledge about the distribution
of the "states of nature" conditioning the outcomes of such decisions
is generally limited: for example, the timing and duration
of the next economic slowdown or recession cannot be well estimated
from the past incidence of such episodes. Hence, these decisions are
typically "difficult" as well as "important." in terms of everyday
language. Uncertainty and acting on fallible expectations cannot be
avoided. The decisions are based on processes blending various amounts
of experience andnewlearning, information and judgment. Data on
the immediate environment of the individual decision maker, relating
mainly to current and recent market transactions, are usually essen-
tial and the first to command attention, but they are seldom sufficient.1
1With respect to current commodities,reasonably competitive and ef-
ficient markets provide in the highly economic form of relative prices
much of the information required for optimal decision—making. For future
goods, however, comparable data generally do not exist for lack of markets
that would equate supply and demand of the goods on specific future dates
at specific currently—established prices. See Arrow (1974), where this
condition is ascribed to the high relative costs of enforcing forward
contracts and the inhibiting effects of uncertainty on the willingness
to assume strong commitments to future actions.2
The economic incentives to reduce uncertainty and improve pre-
dictions and decisions give rise to the demand for large amounts of
diverse information. This is not a new phenomenon, of course, but
it is revealed more clearly than ever in the present era of great
advances in informational technology, for now the demand is to a
large extent visibly satisfied. The "services of inquiring, commu-
nicating, deciding" account for a large and growing proportion of
2 work'performed by men and machines i.nthemodern economy.The
rapidly growing supply of economic information comes from a bewil-
dering array of private and public sources, reflecting trends in
both users' requirements and producers' capacities.3
It is impossible to classify economic information by type of
use or user: a great many time series and surveys are required by
government officials, business managers, and academic researchers
alike, for example. It is also impossible to separate neatly
data that describe the past from data that anticipate the future:
many historical series (e.g., GNP) are in part estimated by extra-
polation and many explicitly forward—looking series (e.g., new
orders and contracts, index of consumer confidence) tell us some-
thing about the past and present. The value of information is not
a general discriminative characteristic either, since it depends
2 Marschak, 1967.
3This is well illustrated by the computerized data banks
which cover thousands of time series representing all types
of variables, Of course, even the largest data banks draw
only on the "public" part of the store of information, not
on the "private"——confidential and high—cost——part.3
on the user's purpose; for instance, business analysts and fore-
casters put a premium on the most recent data, students of economic
history on rare data for the remote past, and model builders and
testers on long, internally consistent, and mutually compatible
series
Economic information, then, must be comprehensively defined as
consisting of data at various levels of aggregation and processing,
from cross—sections of households, firms, and other reporting
units to individual and composite time series.In addi-
tion to the primary data, economic information includes (1)
quantitative, objective measures (e.g., of national income, employ-
ment, prices), and (2) measures that quantify judgments of an at least
partly subjective nature or are qualitative (e.g., indexes of consumer
attitudes and buying plans, capital appropriations and intended
investment outlays, credit ratings). Data in the second category,
mostly the results of sample surveys, contain important elements
of expectations as they sum up assessments of existing condi-
tions and related intentions.
41n the last analysis, informational inputs are worth at the
margin as much as they contribute to the value of the user's
output, whether it is a piece of research, a forecast, or an advice
to a decision—maker. But this is a truism, and not very helpful.
The calculations involved could be made only long "after the fact"
and would certainly be difficult and uncertain in the many cases
where no good measures of the benefits and costs of information
may exist. This applies particularly to the public information
which is not traded and market priced. Complications also arise
from the fact that the information—intensive productive processes
of research, prediction, and decision—making are often closely
interrelated.4
The process of compiling and communicating the information
proceeds in several stages (Figure 1). First, events are ob-
served and recorded in the form of primary data. This function
of data collection, which may also be called inquiring or surveying,
is performed for private purposes everywhere in the economy at least
in some informal fashion. Public information on the economy,
however, is compiled for the most part by government agencies
from primary data collected from firms, households, and other units
in the private and public sectors. These data are then processed,
classified, aggregated, and subjected to various other statistical
procedures, e.g., types of "massaging" (interpolation, extra-
polation, splicing, smoothing).These operations transform the
primary data into the economic measures introduced in the pre-
ceding paragraph. It is generally these measures rather than the
underlying data that are transmitted to the public by various modes
of reporting——releases, telephone, print, etc. In the form in which
the economic measures become available to the user, they consti-
tute, from his point of view, "signals" to work with.
The events, data, measures, and signals are variables, gen-
erally random. The operations whereby events are transformed into
data, data into measures, and measures into signals, can and























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The primary data vary greatly in coverage and quality, depending on
the knowledge and cooperation of respondents and compilers, but in
economics (and other social sciences) they seldom represent the
events in question with complete accuracy.5 Many economic measures
are complex aggregates or index numbers, e.g., national income, GNP
in constant dollars, index of industrial production, consumer price
index; their derivation involves numerous calculations and some approx-
imations and estimations, all of which are subject to various errors.
In general, these operations are irreversible, i.e., it is impossible
to work back to the underlying data from the given measures.6
Substantial improvements in the quality of both the primary
data and the derived economic measures have undoubtedly been
achieved over the years through increased and better use of sampling
techniques and more efficient editing and checking, now powerfully
aided by computers. Much has been learned about how to detect
and reduce biases and errors in respondents' reports and how to
deal with index—number and aggregation problems. Nevertheless,
the collection and processing of primary data remain the critical
operations in the production of economic measurements and so,
not surprisingly, account for most of the defects and errors in
the output. The reporting of the results by the agencies that
5Economists who ignore the errors in the data they use, do so
at their own peril. In contrast, communication engineers are inter-
ested in efficient coding and transmission, not in the deficiencies,
of the data. Hence, the theory of information which got its start
in the telephone industry (Shannon 1948) assumes that data =events.
6This, again, is in contrast to the requirements of the mathe-
matical communication theory (note 5), where encoding transforms
data into signals in such a way that the data can be uniquely re-
constructed from the code.7
produce the information is a lesser source of errors, although
the timing, frequency, and formulation of the releases often
present difficult problems, particularly for time series that are
subject to large revisions.
Where the primary data are reported directly, without being
first transformed into indexes, aggregates, or other economic
measures, the process is greatly simplified (see the broken lines
in Fig. 1, which bypass the "signal" variables and the corresponding
transformations). Here the sources of error and the time required
to prepare and transmit the information are much reduced, since
those inaccuracies and delays that are due to the processing of
the data by the producer and to the processing of the resulting
measures by the user are naturally eliminated. In some rare cases
(the individual coon stock prices provide the pre—eminent ex-
ample), the collected and promptly reported data are virtually
error—free, so that the messages received approximate closely
the primary data.7 But as a rule the data contain errors, and
the procedures for the derivation of economic measures may actu-
ally help reduce these errors, while usually adding others. More-
over, for most purposes of research, forecasting, and decision—
making, raw data, regardless of their accuracy, are simply not
7The statistiraldecision theory abstracts from communication
problems and analyzes the optimal choice of data producing "experi-
ments" (e.g., sampling) and decision rules. It thusequates the
messages received with the data, an assumption to which the above
case corresponds rather well.8
sufficient and measures representing economic variables and con-
cepts are required. The types of information here considered
serve much more often as complements than as substitutes.
Returning to the point at which the economic measures are
received as "signals" by the user, it is to be noted first that
generally this is by no means the end of the information—transforming
process. Even the simplest signals are expressed in symbols that
must be "decoded," but economic measures are often far from simple,
in part because many concepts of economic analysis are difficult,
to approximate. One source of the difficulty here is that the
responsiveness of the supply of primary data to the changing de-
mands of economic research appears to be on the whole sluggish;8
another, that the concepts are not always well defined and univer-
sally accepted. There is inevitably a great deal of inertia and
routine in the massive, manifold, and costly operations of the
statistical government agencies so that improvements in their out-
puts are as a rule partial and gradual. Under these conditions,
it is understandable that users often adjust or "massage" these
statistics in various ways and interpret the results according to
their own preferred concepts (which may deviate from the concepts
adopted by the data—producing agencies). Such further processing of
the information certainly plays an important role in quantitative
economic research, but it is probably frequent inpractical business
applications as well.
8See Kuznets, 1972,pp. 7—22.9
The stock of useful information available to the user depreci-
ates through obsolescence and is replenished by the flow of new data
and measures; a net gain over time in that stock increases knowledge.
It is normally in this context of relating the new to the old infor-
mation with the aid of experience, models, or intuition that meaning
is extracted from——or imparted to——the new "signals," thus converting
them into "messages obtained" (to use the short labels of Fig. 1).
Users with different interests, beliefs, or knowledge may obtain dif-
ferent messages from the same signals.9
As increments to the working capital of economic information,
the messages are inputs into the highly diversified productive pro-
cesses of research, prediction, and public and private decision making.
Thus, they may contrIbute to research findings, e.g., to an internal
analysis of the current business situation prepared by the economic
department of a company for the management. By this route or directly,
they may influence formal forecasts (e.g., of the business economists
in question) or informal expectations (of the same and of management).
Information and forecasts (expectations) shape the judgments, that
is, assessments of the relevant conditions, which are required for
making plans and, eventually, decisions, and they also affect
9To acknowledge thismay be analytically inconvenient, but
it is certainly an important fact which helps explain, a. o.,
the dispersion of individual readings of the current economic vari-
ables and of expectations of their future values. The crucial
role of that dispersion with respect to the behavior of prices
and wages is well known from recent developments in the debate
on the Phillips curve and the theory of aggregate supply (see
Friedman 1968). Expectations are still often treated as if
they were single—valued and universally shared, however.10
the plans and decisions directly. The nexus is represented in
simplified form by the function transforming messages into action
through research—expectations—decisions (see the upper right—hand
box in Fig. l).10
In many instances, the processwhereby decisions produce actions
(inaction is included as a particular case) is simple, definite,
and observable. This may be so even for some important decisions,
e.g., hiring and dismissal of responsible employees in those situ-
ations where work force adjustments are under control of the manage-
ment. It is frequently not so, however, as when uncontrolled vari-
ables complicate the process (e.g., government and unions inter-
vene in the labor market) or when a decision leads to a complex
and time—consuming action which involves many subdecisions and
subactions with an uncertain outcome (consider the decisions to
establish a new business, produce a new motion picture, write a
new economics textbook). Finally, the results achieved depend
as a rule not only on the actions but also on events——changes in
the environment of the decision maker. Thus, actions and events
can be viewed as joint inputs, and results as output, of a transfor-
mation which is a kind of production function.
'°Even this brief description suffices to make it clear that
economic information (in the form of messages obtained) is a code—
terminant rather than a unique determinant of "real—worldt' actions.
Interest in empirically verifiable uses of information, therefore,
precludes adopting the simplification that is convenient for the
purposes of the communication theory, where actions =messagesand
the results are good if messages =data,bad otherwise.
For another view oftherelationship between information
(predetermined variables), expectations, judgments, and plans, see
Theil, 1965, pp. 18—22.11
In principle, this function accounts for all the result—
relevant events and actions properly measured and so, with no basic
randomness in behavior, it is deterministic. In practice, at least
not all the events are properly measured (or indeed known) and
it may be difficult to determine the form of the function. Hence,
here, too, there is much room for problems and errors. The results
of the uses of economic information are generally uncertain and
hard to assess. This is particularly the case when the round trip
depicted in Fig. 1 is time—consuming, for then changes in the environ-
ment may have occurred that were not correctly diagnosed and prog—
nosed with the available information, so that the actions confront
a new set of events, in a sense a changed "present." If the actions
have longer consequences, the hazards are still greater because
longer forecasts are required. Moreover, some of these consequences
will then become events that via the flow of information will influ-
ence future expectations, decisions, and actions, so that a feedback
loop would have to be considered (for simplicity, the feedback is
not shown in Fig. 1).
flata collection, processing, reporting, and uses
all have costs that can be measured in terms of dollars
spent on, or resources devoted to, these activities.
Hence, each of the five functions representing the pro-
duction and use of economic information contributes to the
overall cost variable (Fig. 1). But the direct costs are not
the total costs involved: there are also the costs to the user12
caused by the errors in the information and by improper selection
and application of the information. These costs cannot be assessed
until the consequences (results) of the decisions and actions taken
with the aid of the information are revealed. However, quite apart
from the difficulty of measuring these consequences, they are
strictly attributable only to the particular action and the events
in question (state in which the action was taken). But the observed
action might have been produced by a different chain of information
and decision functions, and the corresponding result does not depend
on which of these functions led to that particular action. This
would seem to preclude an unambiguous imputation of the.
indirect costs o the information functions used. Net returns on
the direct costs of these functions can be evaluated, however, if
the results (which may be viewed as gross returns on the actions
taken) are measurable in the same units as the costs, say dollars.11
The broad scheme discussed above with the aid of
Fig. 1 accormuodates a remarkable variety of sources, types, and
uses of economic information: public as well as private
services, producing data either "to stock"——for the
mass of anonymous users——or "to order"——to satisfy the needs of
individual customers; micro— as well as macrodata, quantitative
lion a deeper level, in the theory of optimal choiceamong
different sources of information with different costs, difficult
problems of valuation are faced and rather strong assumptions are
often made, e.g., additive utilities commensurable with dollars
are assigned to action results. See C. B. McGuire and Roy Radner,
1972 (especially chaps. .1 and 6).13
and qualitative; inputs into research as well as public andprivate
decision making. This wide applicability is, ofcourse, achieved by
abstracting from the particular, but it is important to note that
there is in fact a great deal of basic structuralsimilarity as well
as interaction between what might be called macro and micro inforina—
tion "systems." The transformation of primary observations intosys-
tematic measures of certain basic variables (incomes,assets, prices)
is typical of the development of information for both thequantita-
tive study of the economy and the managerial decisionmaking. Also,
information on the economy at large, itself builtup from microdata,
is widely used in business, particularly for theincreasingly impor-
tant intermediate— and long—range planning in large corporations; in
short, outputs of the national intelligence system become inputs into
the microsystems, and vice versa.
Actually, there is no single "system" of economic information
in the sense of an organized whole, whether one thinks of the
process or of its results; rather, thereis an assemblage of
many interdependent activities and outcomes, some of which indeed
constitute or resemble systems. This entire field of human endeavor
has now attained such a size and complexity that thepiecemeal
scientific attack on it, evident in the rapidlygrowing literature
in several disciplines, may be the best available research14
strategy.12 By concentrating on particular segments of the informa-
tion network and short—cutting others, it is possible to isolate prob-
lems and analyze them as though they were lndependent)3
Most of the information—related problems turn out to have strong,
often dominant economic aspects, even if they were first treated by engi-
neers, mathematicians, or statisticians. Particularly fruitful in econom-
ics, however, is the analysis of the search problem: how to allocate
resources in seeking information to be used for a particular purpose
so as to achieve optimal results, given an initial condition of
incomplete information (uncertainty due to ignorance). For example,
a buyer seeking an acceptably low price canvasses sellers until
the marginal benefit no longer exceeds the marginal cost of an addi-
tional unit of search; a worker similarly canvasses employers in
search for higher wage offers; and advertising in product and labor
markets, a powerful instrument for spreading price (and other) in-
formation, reduces greatly the dispersion of prices and wages,
thereby reducing correspondingly the optimum quantity of search. 14
The search theory has many important implications, notably for the
explanation of unemployment and the relative speeds of price and
quantity adjustments in response to demand fluctuations.15
models of rational choice as applied to problems of
information transmission and decision making have been of great
interest in recent years to statisticians, mathematicians, econo-
mists, psychologists, and others; the role of information in organi—
zational planning and control, and behavioral aspects of inforina—
tion, to scholars in the overlapping areas of operations research
and management science, accounting, and computer science.
13See notes 5, 6, 7, and 10 and text above.
14See Stigler, 1961 and 1962.
15Alchian, 1969; Leijonhufvud, 1968, Chap. 2; Mortensen, 1970; Lucas
andPrescott,1974.15
What these developments in microeconomics demonstrate is the
critical role of information in a market context under conditions
of uncertainty.16 In the search process, market data are sampled
directly by the user—decider (sequential sampling is often superior
to single—sample procedures). In terms of our flow scheme, the
processing and communication stages (the bottom row in Fig. 1) are
omitted: data are converted into messages, and the latter into
actions by means of optimum rules (cf. note 7 above). This assumes.
that the data are error free, a simplification rewarded by rigor
in the obtained solutions and acceptable for many purposes of the
analysis. But here, too, it is well to remember that in actuality
data are seldom accurate, e.g., the quoted prices may be distorted
by deliberate deception or by the frequently encountered genuine
difficulties of measurement and sampling.
The focus of the following sections is on the errors of measure-
ment as they appear in economic information and as they affect economic
expectations and behavior, analysis and prediction. The type of inf or—
ination that gets most attention is economic statistics, which generally
involve much processing. Measurement of this type may face serious con-
ceptual and technical difficulties even where the underlying primary
data are relatively accurate (e.g., consider the index number problem
which exists for coon stock prices as well as for commodity prices,
wages, etc.). The importance of the problems raised by the various
deficiencies of economic observations is strongly suggested by asurvey
of the statistics and the related literature, and further demonstrated
16See Hirshleifer, 1973, with a useful list of references.
17For a long list of the latter, see Price Statistics of the
Federal Government, 1961; Stigler and Kindahi, 1970, is a report
on an effort to deal with some of them.16
by the lessons of recent history and of an analysis of the data revi-
sions and forecast errors. Of the many uses of economic information,
none is more important in the long run than the provision of materials
that are indispensable to the scientific progress in economics. un—
proveinents in the validity and reliability of these statistics are
much more difficult to achieve than increases in quantity, and much
more needed.18
II. The Incidence and Influence of Errors in
Economic Observations
Types, Sources, and Significance of Errors
Whether acquired by participants in the actual processes of
production and exchange or processed and distributed by specialized
agencies, information that matters always costs time and other
scarce resources; hence, it is not at all necessarily economic (even
where it is practicable) to try to obtain all the information bearing
on the pending problems or decisions. Models assuming perfect infor-
mation (which is usually taken to imply elimination of all uncertainty,
not only about the past and present but also about the future, in
other words, perfect foresight) are therefore intrinsically unveri—
fiable thought—experiments devoid of contact with an essential part
18Much concern has beenexpressed recently that the role of
academic economists in guiding the development of data andmeasures
in accordance with their professional knowledge andneeds is being
neglected. The more general criticism is that in modern economics
abstract theorizing overshadows observation to the detrimentof
both. See Morgenstern, 1963, passim; Hahn, 1970,pp. 1—2; Leontief,
1971; Worswjck, 1972; Phelps Brown, 1972; and R. A.Gordon, 1976.
Not all of the critique is well taken orput in a proper perspec-
tive, but a significant part surely is. This is not the place to
review the issues and the state of the debate (for some in part
similarly critical but more general and positive appraisals, see
Blackman, 1971, and H. G. Johnson, 1974; for an optimistic long—
range view of the new "age of quantification" in economics, see
Stigler, 1965, pp. 16—17; and for an emphasis on the contributions
of "public" economics, see H. C. Johnson, 1968, and Hefler, 1975).17
of economic reality. Allowing for the effects of imperfect infor-
mation is often difficult but ultimately necessary for mostpurposes.
But "imperfect" must mean not only "incomplete" (as it often does
in economic analysis) but also "erroneous." Errors in economic
observations may be difficult to measure, even detect, and they
certainly attract less attention than they should, but there
are many indications of their pervasiveness.19
Moreover, errors in data and measures, far from being all
random, are frequently systematic, but it is in practice diffi-
cult to separate these categories. In sampling, systematic error
or bias is the error that cannot be reduced simply by taking
larger samples. Even probability sampling often fails to elimi-
nate systematic error, though in principle it should, with the
aid of proper analysis. Nonprobability sampling isvery vulnerable
to systematic errors of various kinds, as are the economic mea-
sures which, as already noted, usually involve a great deal of
data processing. Here the total errormayconsistof several
ingredients that are difficult to assess. There
is the conceptual component which reflects the limitations and
shortcomings of the concepts underlying the measures as well as
the divergencs between the measures and the concepts. There is
the component of procedural and analytical errors broadly
defined, including the errors from data processing and
19Kruskal, 1978, documents this statement withmany examples
and references. Morgenstern, 1963, expands on a long list of
criticisms of government statistics in what is probably still the
most widely cited book on the subject, but his argument is in some
respects and cases one—sided or overstated; see Bowman, 1964, and
Morgenstern, 1964.18
massaging, aggregation, and computational approximations and
truncations. And there is the statistical component of errors
due to the gaps and defects in the primary data and to the
limitations of coverage. Table 1 attempts to provide a synopsis
of all these types of error and their subdivisions, with sum-
mary descriptions of sources, assessments, and remedies, and
some examples from economics. It proved possible to keep the
table simple but not short, self—contained, and self—explanatory
as far as it goes, but certainly not exhaustive.20
One can find statements to the effect that large systematic
errors are easy to spot and remove, hence that they must be rela-
tively unimportant, but this is not correct, for the following
reasons.(1) Suppose that the relative neglect of the data
limitations and inaccuracy is not merely a matter of casual
carelessness, but rather a large—scale phenomenon implying that
greater efforts are not believed to be justified by the prospective
20A search of the literature disclosed noconspectus or syn-
thesizing statement of a similar kind, only scattered or more
specialized discussions. (Morgenstern's book seems to stand alone,
without having evoked much response in the longer run.) In sharp
contrast to the paucity of entries in economics, the bibliography
on the subject of errors is extensive in natural sciences and
psychology (where it embraces both experimental and probability
aspects).It is, of course, also extensive in statistics, but
mainly for probability sampling: nonprobability sampling receives
much less attention and measurement errors even less. For excel-
lent surveys and reference lists, see the articles in the
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) by Deming,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































returns over costs (this would indeed appear to be the case).
Then large numbers of errors would probablyescape attention,
including many systematic errors that with some more effort
would not.(2) The variety of sources and forms of bias, and
the incidence of actual and potential changes in the structure
of the measured phenomena, are such that many systematic errors
are not in fact easy to identify and corect. (3) Even where
such errors are detected and eliminated, this will not be done
without some more or less costly and time—demandingprocess,
whether it is searching and learning by transactors, improving statis—
cal procedures by data collectors and processors, or research by users
of public information. In the meantime, the committed errors will have
had some effects on behavior, further observations, decisions, and results.
The distinction between random and systematic errors is
important because typically the two types of error have differ-
ent consequences and require different treatment. In general,
those economic and econometric models which recognize errors
in variables at all (most do not) proceed on the assumption
that the errors are random. The consequences then are well
known,themain one being that, when the errors occur in the
explanatory variables, the least—square estimates of the regres-
sion parameters will be both biased and inconsistent. Correcting
for errors is by far the best but also the most difficult way
to deal with this problem, particularly when (as is often the
case) the "true" values of one or more variables are not directly22
observable; several other technical ways have been proposed,
none easy and all yielding more or less uncertain approxima-
tions rather than tested solutions.
Systematic errors are hardly tractable at all other than
by detection and correction, and they are potentially much
more damaging than random errors. Biased judgments and expecta-
tions associated with biased measurement can lead to serious
and widespread decision errors that would persist for some time
before being discovered (which then might lead to similarly
widespread, sharp corrective reactions).
Measurement, Expectations, and Behavior:
Some Lessons of Recent History
Striking examples of apparently inconsistent and confusing
movements in important time series are furnished by the history
of the turbulent first half of the 1970s. The various phases of
price and wage controls and decontrols between August 1971 and
is generally difficult to find instrumental variables
that would be highly correlated with the measured variables and
weakly correlated with their errors; moreover, the method assures
only consistent, not unbiased, estimation. As an alternative,
the maximum likelihood method can be applied, but this requires
rather strong assumptions about the measurement errors: that
they are normally distributed and that the ratio of their vari-
ances (say, in a simple two—variable model with errors in both
Y and X) is known.Theseconditions are usually not fulfilled.
For discussions of these and other subsidiary treatments of the
problem, see Johnston, 1972, pp. 281—291; Theil, 1971, pp. 607—613;
and Intriligator, 1978, pp. 190—193. The classical example of a
correction for what are from the theoretical point of view errors
in the observed variables is the estimation and use of permanent
income in Friedman, 1957.23
the early months of 1974 constituted probably the single most
important source of data distortions (and by no means only in
price statistics), but other factors were at work as well, such
as the adjustments to the collapse of the fixed exchange rate
system and the energy crisis.
In particular, during 1973—74 expected inflation rates
lagged well behind the rapidly rising actual rates, according
to all direct survey data known to me; accounting measures
grossly overstated corporate profits and understated inventories;
and extraordinary divergens appeared between real GNP (which
declined between 1973:4 and 1975:1) and industrial production
and nonf arm employment (which declined only after June and
September 1974, respectively).22 The always difficult problems
of valuation of inventories, fixed capital stock, depreciation,
and profits were aggravated by inflation of an intensity unprec-
edented in decades of U.S. history, and the attempted adjust-
ments (e.g., shifts from the FIFO to the LIFO method of inventory
reporting) could not have been and were not promptly and accu-
rately reflected in the published statistics. Total business
investment in constant dollars rose and stayed strong long after
stock market prices fell and returns turned negative, and long
after real consumer outlays on housing and durable and nondurable
goods declined decisively. It was only in the second half of
1974 that real business investment turned down, inventory
22For evidenceon the developments discussed here and
below, see Zarnowitz and Moore, 1977.24
liquidation began, and the recession worsened drastically,
whereas common stock prices and the constant dollar aggre-
gates for personal consumption expenditures (other than
services), retail sales, and housing all show definite down-
ward trends through the years 1973—74. While other factors
(notably the low real cost of capital) can also be seen ex post
as contributing to the strength of investment at the time,.
the overstated profits and overexuberant business expectations
may well have played a major role, consistent with the fact
that contemporary appraisals of the situation by businessmen
and forecasts by economists erred in general strongly on the
Optimistic side.
The rate of new investment should tend to be positively
correlated with (lagged) stock prices, inasmuch as the latter
reflect market valuation of corporate assets: ceteris paribus,
when that valuation rises relative to the replacement cost of
the assets, then the prospective returns to capital improve
relative to the user cost of capital, stimulating the de-
mand for plant and equipment.
23
The evidence from time series
of an average relation of this sort is on balance favorable,
argument underlies the concept of q, defined as
the ratio of the market value of installed capital to the con-
current cost of uninstalled capital goods, in Tobin, 1961,
1969. A different interpretation of the same relationship is
offered in Fama, 1978, where stock returns are viewed as deter—
mined by forecasts of real variables, and especially the change
in the rate of real capital expenditures (the latter being in
turn determined by the real rate of return on capital, change
in output, etc.).25
though not very strong.24 Hence the need to explain the di-
vergent trends in periods such as 1973—74——and here errors of
data and expectations contribute plausibly to the explanation.
However, it should be remembered that this is not the whole
story, for both the stock market and investment respond to
economic growth and fluctuations in characteristic but dif-
ferential ways.25
Not only the directly measured price expectations but also
short—term interest rates substantially underestimated therates
of inflation in 1973—74. This is important because thehypothesis
that capital markets are efficient implies thatthey optimally
evaluate the information pertinent to assess thejoint probability
distribution of inflation rates, since what matters to theinvestors
is the real return on bills and bonds. The evidence fromthe Trea-
sury Bill market indicat-es that interest rates predicted inflation
reasonably well over the short range of one to six months ahead in
24For anearly empirical use of q—type variables in investment
equations for asampleof corporations, see Grunfeld,1960; for recent
uses in aggregate investment functions, see vonFurstenberg, 1977;
Fopcke, 1977; and Fama, 1978.
25Whileinvestmentexpenditures tend to lag at business cycle
turns and do not react strongly to minor fluctuations, comprehen-
sive stock price indexes belong to those sensitive leading indica-
tors that usually anticipate not only the recessions and recoveries
but also the major accelerations and decelerations in generaleco-
nomic activity. Occasionally, the market moves clearly counter—
cyclically as in 1976—78, when, say, the Standard and Poor's 500
index drifted downward for about 18 months, while real GNP and real
business investment continued to rise at not greatly reduced rates.
On the stock market as a leading indicator, see Zarnowitz and
Boschan, 1975, and Kutzen, 1978.26
the period 1953—72, but not in 1973—74, presumably because of large
measurement errors in the latter years. This much can be rather
confidently stated, even though the stronger conclusions from the
tests have been in part successfully contested. Market efficiency
tests are of necessity joint hypotheses tests, which complicates
their formulation and interpretation; and again, suspected syste-
matic measurement errors in the price and interest rate estimates
may have affected the results adversely.
26
The important question about all types of expectations is what
their characteristics actually are, not what they ought to be. An
overview of recent forecasts by business analysts and economists is
presented at this point; tests of bias and autocorrelations of errors
will be considered in the next part of this paper.
Table 2 sums up the evidence on several sets of forecasts of in-
flation (specifically, the percentage change in the implicit price
deflator, IPD) along with the corresponding forecasts for nominal and
real gross national product. To provide a needed historical perspec-
tive, quarterly predictions over varying spans for the 1970s and two
critical subperiods of recession and recovery are compared with each
other and with a longer record of annual predictions.27
26See Faina, 1976, chap. 6, andcomments by Carison, Joines,
Nelson and Schwert, and Fama, 1977. Fama tested the joint
hypotheses of market efficiency and of constancy through time
of expected real returns on bills. The former receives strong
theoretical and empirical support for organized security mar-
kets, while the latter is rather arbitrary. Fama attributes
the negative results of his tests on data extended through
June 1974 to the distortions caused by the price controls that
began in August 1971; he also argues (in the 1977 rejoinder)
that some of the apparent shortcomings of his model may be
due to certain technical data errors in the consumer price in-
dex and the security price quotations.
27See Zarnowitz, 1979, for further information andmore
complete analysis of these and other forecasts of percentage
changes in GNP, real GNP, and IPD.27
TABLE 2
SUMMARY MEASURES OF ERROR IN FORECASTS OF PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN GNP,
REAL GNP, AND THE ThLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR






















































































Forecasts, 1970—75 and Subperiods
1970:3 —1975:4
0.5 —0.1 0.6 0.1
1.7 —0.4 2.4 1.3
0.5 —0.01 0.6 0.3
1.9 0.1 2.8 1.8
2.8 —1.7 5.6 4.7
0.4 —0.1 0.4 0.02
1.7 —0.1 2.0 1.2
3.1 —2.2 4.9 2.9
Recession, 1973:4 —
0.6 0.2 0.7 0.7
2.0 —0.4 4.1 4.1
0.8 0.3 1.1 1.1
2.5 0.2 4.8 4.8
3.0 —2.5 6.6 6.6
0.3 —0.1 0.4 0.3
1.9 0.03 3.6 3.6






























25 1 Quarter 1.2 0.3 1.0 —0.3 0.2 0.2
264 Quarters 3.0 3.0 4.5 3.7 2.2 —1.2
DRI Modi
27 1 Quarter 0.7 0.2 0.7 —0.1 0.3 0.3
284 Quarters 4,5 4.5 5.6 4.8 2.4 —0.8
298 Quarters 1.9 1.9 11.4 11.4 11.1—11.1
Wharton Modele
301 Quarter 0.6 —0.5 0.9 —0.7 0.3 0.3
314 Quarters 4.0 2.9. 4.0 2.9 1.6 —0.3
328 Quarters 1.7 1.7 8.4 8.4 8.1 —8.1
NOTE: MAE =meanabsolute error, ME =meanerror (both in percentage points). An
individual error is defined as difference, predicted change minus actual change.
aporecasts by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) as stated in the Economic
port. Based in part on verified inferences from statements in the Report.
bgource. Research Seminar in Quantitative Economics (RSQE) of the University of
Michigan. Based on several working models.
cColms 1—4: Assumes that next year's percentage change will be the same as the
average percentage change in the four previous years. Columns 5—6: Assumes that next
year's percentage change will be the same as that of the previous years. (In the class
of simple extrapolative models for annual data, projections of average change represent
an efficient benchmark for GNP and real GNP, while projections of last change are pref-
erable for IPD.)
dAverage of forecasts from nine sources: Livingston survey, Fortune magazine,
Harris Trust and Savings Bank, IBM Economic Research Department, National Securities
and Research Corporation, Conference Board Economic Forum, R. W. Paterson (University
of Missouri), Prudential Insurance Co., UCLA Business Forecasting Project.
eSource: Wharton Economic Newsletter, Econometric Forecasting Unit, Wharton
School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. Based on several consec-
utive versions of Wharton models.
Median forecasts from the quarterly surveys conducted by the Mnerican Statistical
Association and evaluated by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
8Source: Data Resources, Inc.29
The annual forecasts——made near the end of the calendar year for
the next year——show reasonably small mean absolute errors and com-
pare favorably with trend extrapolations for both GNP and real GNP
(Table 2, Part A). In fact, the MAE decline slightly over time,
averaging lower in the period since the early 1960s than in the
earlier post—World War II years. Forecasts of inflation are also
better than simple extrapolations in terms of MAE, but only by small
margins. They tend to underestimate strongly the average inflation
rates, much more so in fact than the extrapolations do, particularly
in the 1970s. Most of the forecast sets for current—dollar GNP also
show negative mean errors. In contrast, thepercentage changes in
real GNP are on the average overestimated.
The relatively good record of annual predictions does not imply
that the more difficult task of forecasting quarterly changes with-
in the year ahead can be performed well, too. Forecasts for the
year as a whole can be satisfactory when based on good predictions
for the first two quarters; they tend to be more accurate than
forecasts with longer spans.In the l970s, particularly during
the recession 1973:4 —1975:1and during the early phase of the
following recovery 1975:1 —1975:4,errors of multiperiod predic-
tions cumulated rapidly beyond the spans of two to four quarters
ahead (Table 2, Part B). Studies of earlier multiperiod forecasts
have shown the cumulation to be as a rule less than proportional
28
to the increase in the span,but in 1973—75 the build—up of
28Zarnowitz, 1967, chap. 5 (data for1947—63).30
errors was much greater than usual and definitely more than pro-
portional (that is, involving marginal as well as average errors).
This can be traced primarily to (a) the forecasters' failure to
anticipate and even promptly recognize the downturn in real GNP
and (b) their propensity to underpredict the rates of inflation,
particularly over longer spans.
Forecasts from different sources and models all shared much
the same kinds of errors in the l970s. Certainly, few were pre-
pared at the time for the coincidence of high and rising rates
of inflation with slowing, then declining real activity, and
many were misled by the continuing increase in the nominal aggre-
gates of GNP, sales, profits, etc., especially in the face of
temporarily conflicting signals from such important real aggre-
gates as constant—dollar GNP, industrial production, and employ-
ment. The apparent conflicts are now understood to derive largely
from measurement difficulties associated with the adjustments
of CNP for price changes, the use of shipments, man—hours, and
electric power series as proxies for physical production, and
growth of part—time employment, particularly in the expanding
service sector. Careful deflation and analysis of cyclical
indicators would have helped, but this is largely retrospective
wisdom that was not generally recognized and heeded at the time.
All in all, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
economic expectations and actions erred on a large scale in this
episode, reflecting to a considerable extent the quite real and
29
difficult problems of interpreting the current data.
29Zarnowitz andMoore, 1977.31
III. Expectations and Forecasts with Lacking and Lagging Data
Varieties of Predictive Experience and Performance
The formation and characteristics of expectations vary across
the economy and over time, since they depend on the institutional and
market structure as well as on business and policy conditions. This
general statement may be obvious but it has important implications
which are often ignored. Uniform and invariant formulas for optimum
prediction have little practical value in the economic sphere. On the
other hand, the observed differences in forecasting patterns andper-
formance are by and large plausible and consistent with the usualassump-
tions about economic behavior motivated by self—interest and constrained
by scarce resources (including limited information).
Most financial assets are regularly traded in organized auction markets,
which are demonstrably efficient, at least in the weak sense.3° In such
markets, highly standardized items are traded by numerousparticipants,
including many resourceful professionals; transaction andstorage
costs are low; and information, most of which is publicly available,
is collected and evaluated continually on a massive scale. Newinfor-
mation, therefore, is very promptly reflected in market prices whichare
flexible and fluctuate widely, so that the pricechanges are typically
not autocorrelated, i.e., not exploitable for predictivepurposes.
However, most of the goods and services that makeup the measured out-
put of the economy are not determined in well organized auction markets,
30Certainly there is now muchcarefully prepared and convincing
evidence that current stock prices are "hard to beat" as predictors
of future stock prices. See Fama, 1970, and Poole, 1976, for discus-
sion and references.32
and no efficient market expectations exist for their prices and quan-
tities. Clearly, it is only reasonable for the forecasting behavior
and performance to be quite different for these variables than for
the prices and returns determined in the securities and futures markets.
Knowledge of the long—term explicit or implicit contracts, which
exist in many product and factor markets, particularly those for labor,
would presumably be most helpful to prediction of the variables involved.31
Unless the contracts are so short or o flexible as to duplicate the
effects of spot markets (an unlikely case, for they would then be essen-
tially redundant), they will introduce a measure of "stickiness" into the
wage and price formation, which has important implications.32 Contracts
are modified as new information reveals their previously unanticipated costs,
but this takes time. In the interim, adherence to the present arrangements
would delay adjustments to the new shocks, and thus probably impede to some
31Recent attempts to explain the apparent importance of the contracts
stress in various degrees several factors: transaction costs of frequent
pricing setting and wage negotiations, including costs of ascertaining
profits and other data; high risk aversion of employees; and requirements
of maintaining the good will of customers and workers, as perceived by the
firms. In this view, most wages and many prices are predetermined, which reduces
their flexibility in the short run. Over time, more flexibility is expected
and observed, within limits imposed by the costs of collecting the required
information and agreeing on its interpretation. The greater the prospec-
tive variability of the economy (of output and inflation during business
cycles), the more information will be used to reduce the contractual in—
flexibilities and the shorter will be the prevailing contract periods.
For a review of the contractual wage and price theories, see R. J. Gordon,
1976, pp. 207—210; for a different line of criticism, see Lucas and Sar—
gent, 1978.
32The most familiar of these is thatmonetary policy may then
influence output in the short run even under rational expectations
(Phelps and Taylor, 1977; S. Fischer, 1977), but perhaps the most
general one concerns the interaction of contracts with expectations,
as noted in the text below.33
extent the process of learning which is apt to be a necessary part of
the development of a rational expectations model.33 It would then seem
that the effect of temporal contractual rigidities may be similar to that
of informational delays. The intuitively appealing argument is that just
as a prompt reaction to events produces new information promptly, so
delayed reaction works in a way parallel to an information lag. In gen-
eral, the longer the effective lags that are involved, the more inaccurate
are the short—term expectations likely to be. Assuming a lag of, say,
k time units, predictions for periods shorter than kmay well be biased
or show autocorrelated errors even if they are formed rationally, that
is, optimally given the available information.
Now the proper concept of an "effective" lag must here include not
only the time required for incremental data to be produced and transmitted
to the user but also the time required for the signals to be extracted
from these data by the user. This lag exceeds the unit period for many
economic time series, particularly where the data undergo much processing
and revision, are uncertain or volatile and difficult to interpret. One
or more of these descriptions apply to most of the important macroeconomic
measures.
To illustrate, the GNP data are available only quarterly and then
subject to significant lags and revisions. Great uncertainties attach
to the meaning of the measured changes in such critical variables as
the general price level, national output, the rate of unemployment,
and the money supply. Different measures for closely related aggregates
33Here we touchon what is as yet almost a terra incognita of dif-
ficult problems, as noted in Lucas and Sargent, 1978. For attempts to
deal with learning rules or models in the context of rational expecta-
tions, see Grossman, 1975, and Taylor, 1975.34
show at times divergent movements, making it difficult to assess
contemporary developments (e.g., with respect to the rates of
monetary growth and inflation). Some important series are vulner-
able not only to estimation errors but also to institutional
changes and policy shifts.34 For most of the monthly indicators,
simple calculations suggest that data for at least two—six months
are needed to extract from noise those signals that are meaningful
in the business cycle context (the quarterly series are often
smoother but the effective lags for them must exceed three months,
allowing for the timing of the releases, etc.).35 Much longer
recognition lags would presumably apply to disturbances of partic-
ular types, e.g., structural shifts, which do not conform to histor-
ically observed processes.
Given such uncertainties, individual expectations about the aggre—
gative factors may differ greatly, and there is no trading or other
mechanism here to produce consistent and superior 'consensus" (in a
sense, "market") forecasts. It is true that private economic decisions
depend primarily on measures and predictions of microvariables which
are often simpler and generally much more familiar to the agents. But
there, too, similar signal extraction problems exist, which may be
aggravated by the difficulties of distinguishing between the local
and the aggregate disturbances.36 Moreover, expectations on the
34For example, recent changes inbanking practices and legislation
increased the substitutability of certain types of liquid assets for
narrowly defined means of payments, which strongly reduced the impor-
tance of M1,and enhanced that of the broader monetary aggregates.
35See Shiskin, 1973, and Handbook ofCyclical Indicators, 1977,
Tables 3A and 3B.
36These problems have attracted much interest recentlyon a theoret-
ical level; see Lucas, 1975: Poole, 1976; Kormendi, 1978.35
micro level are related to those for particular sectors and for the
economy as a whole; the widespread use of economy— and industry—wide
forecasts in prediction and planning on the corporate level is well
in evidence. Little is known about the effects of these processes
of interaction and diffusion, though they presumably matter and could
be disturbing.37 Particularly important are the expectations con-
cerning those data that are selected by the authorities to serve as
intermediate targets and instruments of discretionary policies——
notably the monetary aggregates and short—term interest rates moni-
toredby the Federal Reserve. The forecasting and operating proce-
dures of the authorities are affected by how frequent, current, and
reliablethose data are,38 though their success depends
ultimately on the reactions of the economy to the anticipated and
actual policy actions.
Tests of Bias and Autocorrelations of Errors
What can be realistically expected of true economic predictions,
what desirable properties should they have, and how should they be
tested? Recent wor1 on forecast evaluation produced
interesting results that bear on these questions,
but there a±e still disagreements on the answers. As sug-
gested by the preceding discussion, the difficulties lie in (a) the
37
Phelps and Taylor, 1977, p. 186, refer to a situation in which
"the decisions in an industry or sector may be interpreted as signals
from which the rest of the economy draws inferences (correct or not)
as to the new information causing those decisions. Some question may
then arise over the existence of a (stochastic) equilibrium of self—
confirming expectations and decision rules."
38See B. Friedman,1977, with discussion.36
diversity of situations and problems involved in the predictive uses
of limited information, and (b) the quantitative and qualitative dif-
ferentiation of the available data.
In the case of a repeatedly examined set of price expectations
data, findings of apparently systematic errors have led different ob-
servers to two opposite conclusions:(1) reject the data as being in-
consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis and therefore
seriously defective and presumably nonrepresentative; (2) accept the
results as a piece of evidence against that hypothesis. But neither
of these extreme positions is persuasive, since both overstate the
implications of the theory and understate the role of lags and defects
of information.
The data are averages from a rather informal semi—annual survey
of economic forecasters going back to l947. As is often the case,
the evaluation of these predictions yields mixed results. The errors
in forecasts of the consuther price index fail to pass F—tests based
on comparisons with selected autoregressive extrapolations, but
the errors in the corresponding forecasts of the wholesale price index
pass the same tests on the .05 level of significance. Moreover, when
compared with predictions from autoregressive equations re—estimated
every six months with data available prior to the time of the survey,
37
The attraction of these data, compiled by Joseph A. Livingston,
a syndicated columnist now with the Philadelphia Inquirer, is their
long record. They are, however, difficult to handle because (a) the
survey averages were adjusted for the differences between the base
values available to the forecasters and the most recent figures re-
leased shortly before the publication of the results, and (b) there
is some uncertainty about the precise time intervals to which the
forecasters intended their predictions to refer. Carlson, 1977, re-
ports on a careful reworking of the Livingston data to take these
problems into account. The text that follows refers to Carison's
findings. Earlier studies of this set of data used no timing adjust—
ments (see Pesando, 1975, and Carison, 1977, for other references).37
the forecasts for both indexes are found to be on the average the more
accurate. Yet there is clear evidence of substantial underestimation
of price rises in periods of wartime—related or other strong outbursts
of inflation (in 1950, the late 1960s, 1973—74).
The tests of "rationality" that have been performed on various
sets of forecasts are addressed to bias, autocorrelations of errors,
and comparisons with selected time—series models. Of these, the
latter tests are the most stringent, but they presume that the charac-
teristics of the series viewed as a stochastic process are suffi—
'ciently identifiable and stable, which is often not the case because
of the limitations of the available data and techniques or changing
environment.38 However, in thosecases where the time series prop-
erties of the predicted variables are reasonably stable, well known
andtested,it is indeed appropriate to require that the forecasts
embody these properties: those forecasts that do not are of dubious
validity inasmuch as they contain errors whose elimination would
have been possible and profitable.
The simplest, frequently applied tests consider the relation-
ship between actual values y and the predicted values 9 in the
linear form y = + soas to see whether the sample estimates
38Estimation ofsatisfactory time series models requires longer
and more consistent data than are available for many economic series.
Furthermore, the models are usually developed ex post from revised
historical data, often after a long search for best results (with the
rejected alternatives being seldom reported). The procedure may
then imply that actual forecasts, based on the contemporaneous (at
least partly preliminary or estimated) data, are "rational" only if
they mimic the results of a formula representing the eventual out-
come of one set of such retroactive experiments. Conclusions of
this kind are generally not convincing as they disregard not only
the data problems but also the possible changes over time in the
underlying relationships, the learning behavior of the forecasters,
and the role of information other than that contained in the bench-
mark model,38
of a and differ significantly from 0 to 1, respectively. In
practice, F tests are used to examine the joint null hypothesis that
a0 and bl in
(1) y=a+b9+v
acceptance of the hypothesis means that the criteria of unbiasedness
and efficiency are met in the sense that
(2) E9Ey and (3)cov(y, 9)/var 9 =1
where E, coy, and var denote expected value, covariance, and vari-
ance, respectively. When a 0, the prediction is said to be unbiased;
when =1,it is said to be efficient. The latter condition requires
that the observed errors u = — beuncorrelated with the predicted
values 9. A predictor 9 that satisfies both (2) and (3) may or
maynotbe optimal (for certain linear models of y it is), but 9 that
fails to satisfy (2) or (3) cannot be optimal.39
While these tests provide interesting information in many cases,
it is generally advisable to go beyond them and examine directly the
properties of the time series of u, the prediction errors. Of par-
ticular concern is the question of whether there are any autocorrela—
tions among these errors that could be exploited to improve the forecasts.4°
39
Let E(ylx) =a+xbe the expectation of y, the variable to
be predicted, conditional upon x, the single explanatory variable, with
the joint distribution of (y, x) known. Then 9 =a+bxwill meet
(2) and (3) if and only if a =aand b =. Ageneralization to
the model E(yX) =a+B'X, where X is the vector of explanatory
variables is straightforward. For a rigorous development of these
ideas and proofs, see Hatanaka, 1974. Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969,
give a statement of the criteria (2) and (3), note their limita-
tions, and provide applications to several forecast sets for
1953—63 (see text below).
400n the need for the autocorrelation tests, see Granger and
Newbold, 1973.39
Analyses of annual forecasts of GNP, business outlays on new
plant and equipment, and industrial production for 1953—63 show that
the F—ratios are generally not significant at the conventional .01
and .05 levels. However, the samples of forecasts for any given
source and variable are small, and the power of the tests is low
for any of the alternatives to the joint null hypothesis.41
A study of a larger collection of forecasts introduced earlier
(see Table 2 and text above)suggests that annual predic-
tions of GNP, 1953—76, do not contain large, systematic errors that
could have been readily avoided or corrected in advance. The errors
of these forecasts generally have zero or very low autocorrelations.
In contrast, appraisals of the recent quarterly tnultiperiod
forecasts indicate the presence of substantial systematic errors.
In a study of 1970—75 predictions of real GNP, IPD, and the unemploy-
ment rate, equation (1) was estimated in two ways, by ordinary least
42 squares (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS). Using OLS, the
41When significance levels of .10 and .25are used to increase
power, it is found that the F—ratios are in many cases significant.
The forecasts of personal consumption expenditures show most bias.
See Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969, pp. 11—19.
42See McNees, 1978.Quarterly multiperiod forecasts refer to cumula-
tive changes during overlapping time periods = — where
capital letters denote the levels of the given variable and i =1,...,n
denotes the predictive span). The assumption that the disturbances in
(1) are serially uncorrelated is apt to be inappropriate here. A random
shock or a measurement error which occurs at t and is not offset in the
subsequent n quarters will appear iny, ..., ifunantici-
pated, it will also appear inv, ..., Under these condi-
tions, which do not allow for learning on the part of the forecaster, a
GLS transformation would be indicated. However, if shock reversals and
learning behavior are assumed, OLS will be the preferable technique in
certain cases.40
joint null hypothesis was rejected by the F test at the .05 level for
17, and at the .01 level for 5, of the 36 regressions examined. Using
GLS, the hypothesis was rejected by the corresponding tests for 13 of
17 regressions. These results refer to forecasts made quarterly, for
one—four quarters ahead, with the aid of three well—known econometric
models, Chase, DRI, and Wharton.
Table 3 presents estimated autocorrelation coefficients
(i =1 ,4,denoting lags of one to four quarters) for the errors
of quarterly forecasts of GNP, real GNP, and IPD for 1970—75. It cov-
ers predictions with spans of 1—8 quarters from the same three models
and the ASA—NBER surveys (median forecasts). With few exceptions, the
first autocorrelation coefficients exceed in absolute value the stan-
dard errors that sample autocorrelations would have in a random model (see
cols. 1, 6, 11, 16 and note b).43 Indeed, the estimates tend to in-
crease with the span of forecast and are as high as 0.6—0.9 for the pre-
dictions looking 4—8 quarters ahead. The higher—order autocorrelations
tend to get progressively lower, but the and p3 statistics are still
large relative to their standard errors in a number of instances, partic-
ularly for the longer spans. The chi—square tests for the Q statistics sug-
gest that the probability of the errors not being white noise is often high
(at least 90 or 95 percent) for spans of three and more quarters (see cols.
5, 10, 15, and note a). The signs of the autocorrelation coefficients
are predominantly positive for small displacements but turn increasingly
negative for i >
43For additional evidence that first autocorrelatjons oferrors in
one—quarter—ahead forecasts are more frequent than could have occurred
by chance alone, see McNees, 1978.
44The estimates of p for the more distantlags are not shown be-
cause sampling variability makes them unreliable, given the small size
of the available forecast sets. It may be worth mentioning, however, that
the lowest estimates are generally those for P4 and ,whilethose for




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The forecasts of GNP are shown in better light by the statis-
tics than the real GNP and LPD forecasts are, which agrees with other
measures of predictive performance based on these materials (see Table
2 and text above). No substantial differences in the error autocorrela—
tion patterns appear to exist between the four sources of forecasts
covered in Table 3 (lines 1—22). This reinforces other findings that
indicate the presence of strong elements of common reaction and common
surprise among the forecasters.
Moreover, similar autocorrelatioris patterns emerge when the cor-
responding measures are calculated for errors in the preliminary esti-
mates of the three variables, thatis,for deviations of the preliminary
from the revised data (lines 23—28). This suggests that measurement
errors, which are presumably reflected in the revisions, mayhavecon-
tributed to the dependencies among the forecast errors.
To my knowledge, all evidence on the quarterly predictions covered
in Tables 2 and 3 is consistent with the conclusion that they show much
the same configuration of apparently nonrandom errors. These are re-
corded predictions by some of the most prominent business economists
and econometric model builders, which were widely disseminated, purchased,
and presumably used at the time, in both the private and public sectors.
Other forecasts made public concurrently were not demonstrably more
successful. There is no firm proof that any particular forecasting
method would have produced more accurate results, although it is clear
that some types of prediction such as extrapolations from time—series
models are in general unbiased. As of now, the record definitely does44
not support the claim that business cycle movements and major variations
in the rate of inflation can be predicted well over periods of several
quarters ahead.45
Data Revisions and Forecasting
Current business analysis and forecasting are hampered by the lack
of firm knowledge of the present and even of the recent past. For ex-
ample, the detailed data underlying the benchmark estimates for GNP
areobtained at intervals of several years from cross—section surveys
(mainly Census Bureau tabulations and IRS tax returns). To get quarter—
by—quarter figures with minimum delays, changes in related continuous
series (retail sales, business capital outlays, federal government expen-
ditures, foreign trade and payments) are used to interpolate between the
benchmarks and to extrapolate beyond them. As a result, the provisional
GNP estimates contain errors arising from (1) imprecisions in the bench-
mark data; (2) inaccuracies in the related series used for quarterly com-
pilations; and (3) inexact or misspecified relationships between the
benchmark data and the related series.
The provisional data are revised several times as more complete
returns from sample surveys permit extensions of coverage in the time
series used as inter— and extrapolators. In addition, major revisions
45As noted earlier, annual forecasts tend to show smaller and less
systematic errors, but they do not face the same problems since the short
cyclical movements largely average out in the year—to—year changes. Unlike
annual changes, the quarterly changes in GNP and, particularly, in real
GNP show considerable autocorrelation (even apart from seasonal variation).
The rates of inflation are much more highly autocorrelated yet.45
occur in the years when new Census data become available for benchmark
construction, and on these occasions conceptual revisions are often
made in addition to statistical ones46
The statistical revisions reduce mainly one type of error,
namely, that resulting from lags in the availability of primary data.
About 60 percent of all pre—1965 revisions in GNPandits major com-
ponents had the effect of bringing the estimates closer to the "final"
figures which can be reasonably viewed as the best of the available
approximations (though they may still contain significant, if generally
unknown, errors). Also, the successive revisions reduced by more than
half the variance of the statistical discrepancy between the initial
estimates of GNPbasedon expenditures and income data. In this
limited sense, then, most but by no means all revisions do help in-
crease the accuracy of these series.47
Even in the ideal case of ultimately perfect data, economists
could not ignore all measurement problems: for example, expectations
which play a major role in economic life are to a large extent based
on provisional informatioñ'and hence influenced by the lags and
errors involved. Business analysts and forecasters must use
46Specifically, GNPreleasesissued in each month of quarter tpro-
vide successive sets of advance and provisional data for quarter t—1
(called, respectively, the 15—, 45—, and 75—day release). Then there are
two or three annual July revisions and finally one or more benchmark re-
visions. Also, revisions in the seasonally adjusted data are made freq-
uently. The seasonal adjustment factors must themselves be first pre-
dicted, but they can be more accurately estimated once data covering a
full year are in hand; hence, the July revisions are particularly impor-
tant here.
47For historical evidence,see Cole, 1969a. Further studies on
other and more recent data seem sorely needed in this area.46
provisional estimates, and frequent revisions, whether or not success-




I =1,2, ...,bethe series of
estimates available to the forecaster at time t.Thesevalues are
provisional estimates for the most recent periods (small i's) and
at least once revised figures for the earlier periods. For suff i—
ciently large values of i, the observational errors fl_ are nor—
0 mallyzero. As a rule, itis3ust such mixed—vintage series y
not the "final" revised series y, that serve as inputs to active
econometric models and in the work of current business analysts and
forecasters generally.
Early appraisals of recent forecasts must use the provisional
data for the actual values, which yields the first estimates of the
forecast error defined as =— y.Historical evaluations
may use the final data, which leads to a determination of the revised
estimates of the forecast error as u =y
— Thetwo measures
of forecast error and the observational error n are linked by a
simple additive relation:
0 0 (4) U
= — = — + — = +n
For the means of the three error terms, it follows that
(5)
ln where uand and are defined analogously. For
t=l47
variances,(4) implies
2 2 2 (6) var u =varc + var r + 2 cov(, n)or =s+ s + 2rss
2 l 2 where s =
Cut
—ii),etc.,and r is the coefficient of u
correlation between and flu.Taking second moments around
zero yields
(7) M2+s2
as the mean square error for u; and are defined analogously.
It then follows from (5) and (6) that
(8)M = +2) + 2 + s2) + 2 +rss) =++ 2N
The decomposition (8) is informative in that it takes account explicitly
of all the relevant elements of bias, variance, and interaction terms.48
All these expressions are for sample statistics; the counterparts
of (4) and (8) in terms of population parameters are (4') Eu =E+ En
and (8') Eu2 =Ee2+ En2 + 2E(c). Sampling variation alone could
make the calculated means or the estimated r coefficients differ from
zero even if the data and forecasts were really unbiased or their
errors uxicorrelated. Tests of significance are therefore indicated.
481n the case ofno biases,(8) reduces to (6). In the case
of r =0,2 =+s, so that pure predictive accuracy is properly
measured in terms of and is understated in terms of .iwhich
incorporate estimates of measurement error T.48
The importance of errors in provisional data is demonstrated
by the following measures for equations (5) and (8), which refer
to the forecasts of annual levels of GNP in l953—63.
= + = +M +
Billions of dollars—10.0—5.2—4.8 229.9136.839.3 53.8
Percent 100.0 59.517.1 23.4
The error terms and tend to be both negative, since the
forecasts underestimated the provisional GNP figures and the revisions
raised the latter in most years. The t—tests for EC0 and E =0
indicate that the biases are significant at conventional levels for
several forecast sets and the corresponding data. The interaction term
2M is positive and substantial as, is its bias component 2ff, which
dominates the other component 2rss; the coefficients are mostly
negative and near zero or small. The Ti errors show sizable positive
autocorrelations, which implies that the errors would tend to be offsetting
when the preliminary data are used both as inputs into the forecasts and
as realizations with which the forecasts are compared.5° Predictions that
49Here measurementerrors are Ti =y
— wherey° denotes the
first estimates of GNP for the preceding year and y denotes the data from
the August 1965 benchmark revision. The first observed forecasts errors are
=— y,where y stands for the weighted average forecasts of GNP
based on the data listed and described in Zarnowitz, 1967, Table 1 and text,
pp. 12—16. These are mainly judgmental forecasts from various business and
academic sources. They are combined into averages weighted by the number
of years covered by each of the forecast sets. All errors are computed by
subtracting the actual from the predicted values.
50For 'the development of thisargument and supporting evidence, see
Cole, l969b, especially pp. 56—57, and Zarnowitz, 1967.49
rely heavily on such data would therefore be expected to show smaller
average errors when evaluated against early figures than when evaluated
against revised figures, and this is indeed the case for most of the
forecasts of GNP and its major expenditure components covering the
1950s and 1960g. For example, in the summary above, is little more
than half the size of ii, absolutely, and is about six—tenths
of HU
Itis useful to analyze forecasts of changes as well as of levels.
If the initial level ("base") from which a change is predicted is known
in terms of preliminary data y°, while the outcome of the forecast is
evaluated in terms of the revised data y, the error in predicting
change between t and t + i is





Thisillustrates the rule that the level error equals the total change
error plus the base error. But (9) oversimplifies the forecasting sit-
uation most likely to be encountered in practice. Typically, even y
is unknown and the j—th forecaster must make his or her own estimate
of the base, say, y.Then
(10) = — — (y— = — —
where =y
—y.If the outcome of the forecast is evaluated in
terms of the preliminary data, the corresponding formula is
(11) t+i =+j
— — — = —50
The history of the GNP forecasts reveals a preponderance of
underestimates of both the base levels and the changes, which add
up to larger average errors of the same type in the future levels.
This is illustrated in the tabulation below, which uses decomposition
(11), with j =1for annual data.51 However, industrial production
Mean Error (ME) Mean Absolute Error (MAE)
BaseChangeLevel BaseChangeLevel
GNP, 1953—63 (bil. dollars) —2.1 —3.2 —5.2 2.9 8.4 10.0
GNP, 1953—69 (bil. dollars) —3.5 —3.8 —7.3 3.8 8.5 10.6
Real GNP, 1953—63
(1947—49 =100) —0.9 —1.4 —2.3 1.2 3.6 4.1
Indus. Prod., 1953—63
(1947—49 =100) 0.8 —0.8 —0.09 1.3 4.1 4.3
forecastsfrom the same sources are different in that here, errors of
base and of change often disagree in sign, which helps reduce the level
errors. Monthly data provide more current information than quarterly
data, which gives an advantage to the forecasts of industrial produc-
tion relative to those of GNP. But the general conclusion, based on
reasonably comprehensive and representative materials, is that base
errors affect importantly most aggregative predictions. As shown by
the suiary above, they amount to about 30 percent of the corresponding
level errors when averaged without regard to sign. Although the base
forecasts are on the whole close to the earliest government statistics
for the same periods, and are indeed frequently no less accurate than
5The descriptions and measures for each of the forecastsets
used are given in Zarnowitz, 1967, chaps. 2 and 4 with Table 4,
pp. 33—34 (for 1953—63) and in Zarnowitz, 1972, pp. 203—206 with
Table 1 (for 1953—69). See also footnote 49 above.51
the latter,52 it is clear that the forecasters' imperfect know-
ledge of the present contributes substantially to their errors in
predicting the future.
A simple and effective way to minimize the effects on fore-
casts of the base revisions is to express the predictions and their
errors in terms of percentage changes.53 Thus viewed, the annual
predictions of GNP earn good marks for overall accuracy when judged
according to realistic standards (see Table 2 and text above).
The errors in predicting percentage changes in GNP, real GNP, and
IPD all average close to one percentage point for 1963—76 (see the
MAE figures for the s—type errors in the accompanying summary),54
Dataerrors, however, are by no means negligible even when assessed
on this plan: the MAE for the corresponding
riseries are about
one—third of one percentage point.
GP Real GNP IPD
MA! ME MAE ME MAE ME
Forecast errors ()0.9—0.5 1,20.3 1.0—0.6
Percent. points
Data errrors (ri) 0.3—0.3 0.4—0.1 0.4—0.3
Percent. points
52Cole, 1969a, pp. 29—35.
53lndeed, there are several goodreasons for this type of approach.
Percentage changes often depend less on the levels and are more stable and
comparable over time than absolute changes. This is particularly important
for variables with strong trends. Moreover, it is the rates ofgrowth in
income, output, price level, etc., that are of principal interest toana-
lysts and policy makers.
54Here the forecasterrors c equal predicted percentage changes
minus actual percentage changes, where the latter are basedon first offi-
cial estimates for the preceding year. The data errorsntequalthe per-
centage changes in the same preliminary estimates minus the corresponding
changes in revised figures taken from the May 1977 Handbook of Cyclical
Indicators.52
Unlike in the 1950s and l960s, when GNP forecast errors and
data errors tended to agree in sign so that >ki,M >0,
and M >M (see pp. 48—49 above), in the first half of the
l970s the signs of and differed most of the time, causing
opposite results. While forecasters overestimated real growth, the
early data for constant—dollar GNP often showed less growth than the
revised data (note the signs of T and in columns 7 and 8 of
Table 4, respectively). While forecasters underestimated inflation,
early data for IPD systematically showed more inflation than the
revised data (cf. cols. 13 and 14). For GNP, the results are more
mixed, but most of the values are negative, most of the
values positive (cols. 1 and 2). The M termsare,with few
c.fl
exceptions,negative (cols. 5, 11,and18), reflecting the signs
of cov(E, ri).As a result, Mu <Mfor most of the forecasts
covered in Table 4, including about two—thirds of those for GNP,
slightly more than half of those for real GNP, and all of those
for IP?. In other words, the quarterly multiperiod predictions
for 1970—75 show smaller average errors when compared with revised
data than when compared with provisional data.
Since the current quarterly econometric models are implemented
with revised data except for the most recent observations, one might
argue that the above result is not surprising for the forecasts pro-
duced with the aid of these models. The point has some validity but
it is blurred by the coon practice of judgmental adjustments,
which are demonstrably important to econometric forecasting and
55
are likely to reflect information about some late events. Also,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































as shown before, the pre—1970 results are quite different for econo-
metric as well as other predictions. It is well established that
the accuracy of all types of forecasts depends critically on the dif-
ferential economic characteristics of the periods covered, and data
errors, which are partly in the nature of extrapolation errors, may
also vary significantly with such characteristics.56
The quarterly data covered in Table A are based on pre—1976 re-
visions. Had we used the major benchmark revisions published in
January 1976, which introduced several important conceptual changes
in the national income and product accounts, the Ti errors would
have been about twice as large on the average (without regard to sign).
The summary measures of the size and role of data errors (fi,N)
tend to increase in absolute value over longer predictive spans, but
only irregularly and much less than the measures for the forecast errors
(?,Me).As a result, data errors, although substantial as such, are
small in comparison with the forecast errors in the period 1970—75;
and dominates in the decompositions of Table 4, particularly
for the longer predictions.
In general, the common complaints of macroeconomic forecasters about
the size and frequency of revisions in GNP accounts (and some other aggre-
gate statistics) make sense in light of the high probability that large
improvements in the accuracy of preliminary data would result in signifi-
cantly better predictions. But such improvements are costly and diff i—
cult to achieve. What economists themselves can more readily do is to
56Zarnowitz, 1979; Cole, 1969a.55
make more efficient use of the available data by exploiting forpre-
dictive purposes the relationships between the preliminary and the
revised estimates. Proposals to this effect are of very recent origin
but they deserve much careful attention.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The activities and products of information,measurement, and pre-
diction are essential to the contemporary U.S. and otherhighly developed
countries, but it can hardly be claimed that they are well documented or
understood. Although very diversified, they are so interrelated that
it is advisable to treat them jointly as a researchsubject. Accord-
ingly, much ground had to be covered in this paper, from an overview of
the flow of economic information to a selectiveanalysis of measurement
errors and their economic effects, particularly as transmitted through
expectations and forecasts. Only a brief summary statement and somesug-
gestions for further study are needed here to conclude thereport.
1. Economic data are subject to errors due toinadequate sampling,
concealment, falsification, poorly trained collectors, and various other
reasons. Further, there is much uncertainty about economicmeasures,
which tends to increase with the amount and complexity of theprocessing
performed on the underlying data and with the distance between theuser
and the processor. Some important information,notably the price data
for financial assets traded in organized auctionmarkets, is both prompt
57See Iwrey, 1977.56
and generally accurate, but most is not: as a rule, economic time
series lag well behind their reference periods and many undergo
large revisions. The effective information lag includes not only
the time required for incremental data to be produced and trans—
tnitted but also the time required for the signals to be extracted
from these data by the user. For most economic time series, which
are noisy, this lag exceeds the unit period and is measured in months.
2. In general, there is no presumption that the measurement
errors are random: systematic errors are frequent and their sources
and forms vary so much that they may be difficult to detect. Biased
measurement may lead to biased judgments and expectations, hence to
serious and broadly diffused decision errors. It takes some time
before such errors are discovered, and the corrective reactions which
then follow are apt to be sharp and similarly widespread. In times of
strong shocks and surprising developments, measurement of short—term
changes in the economy is particularly difficult and current signals
are often liable to be misinterpreted. For the period 1970—75, con-
temporary time—series data, business conditions reports, and forecasts
provide substantial evidence in support of these statements.
3. Aggregative predictions from well known and influential sources
show certain coon patterns of error, which suggests that forecasters
react similarly to the observed events and unanticipated shocks (they
also interact, but it is difficult to assess the relative importance
of these factors). The quarterly multiperiod forecasts for 1970—75
show errors that cumulate strongly with the span of the prediction and57
are autocorrelated for the longer spans. Forecasts of GNP and other
variables measured with significant lags and subject to substantial
revisions are adversely affected by errors in both the preliminary
data and the base level estimates. There is somesupport here for
the hypothesis that information lags play an important role ingen-
erating business cycles, but it is not very strong. It is important
to note that the errors involved in predicting the future are typically
much larger than the errors involved in estimating thepresent or
recent past.
4. It is one thing to argue that economic measurement problems
are serious and deserve much more attention from the profession than
they now receive, and quite another thing to specify what exactly
should be done about it. The fact is that there are nosimple or
well established ways of dealing with the effects of deficient infor-
mation on economic expectations, analysis, and behavior. But this is
surely no excuse for ignoring the problems involved. Assessments of
the significance and quality of the data for a givenpurpose are part
and parcel of the task on hand, and they can bevery instructive.
Replications of economic calculations with different sets of data
should also be encouraged and publicized for they performimportant
verification functions. A study of some assembled materialson such
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